Monday, January 17, 2011

"De Lubac on Nature and the Supernatural," David Crawford

The basic thesis of a pure nature was more or less taken for granted by theologians from the 16th-20th century, seen as traditional teaching

"Pure nature" = a nature interiorly ordered toward a purely natural end/fulfillment/perfection

Necessary in order to guarantee the gratuity of divinization, of man's elevation to supernatural beatitude

An innate desire of nature cannot be directed to something beyond the possibilities of that nature to attain: this would  be a contradiction of the meaning of nature. The desire of a nature must be for that which is "proportionate" to it.
  • If this were not the case, then the supernatural would somehow be "owed" to nature, which threatens its gift-character
  • Would place demand on God: he cannot create a nature whose deepest longing is for a finality beyond itself and then deny fulfillment to it; God would be required to give his grace to man

Most proponents want to propose this natural end only as a possibility, admitting that in the concrete order our only end is life with God
  • Yet at the same time, hold that our desire for the supernatural is not grounded in the depths of human nature, but merely "elicited" from us and "willed" by us once it has been revealed

Ultimately, transfer of the hypothetical "pure nature" into the concrete

Supernatural end comes to supplant the natural end of man

De Lubac's problem with the hypothesis of pure nature is not its formal and abstract possibility, but with the use of this formal concept to guarantee the gratuity of the supernatural
  • Using the formal possibility in this way suggests that, where such a purely natural end does not exist (e.g. in our world), the "supernatural" is not gratuitous
  • Premises that the only way to guarantee the gratuity of the supernatural is the possibility of pure nature

For de Lubac, the "natural" desire for the supernatural is at a deep level constitutive of what it is to be human

Taking man's end seriously means that it cannot be thought of as a mere "destination," as a "goal" that could be replaced at some point with another "goal" (as is suggested by the hypothesis of pure nature)
  • Hypothesis of pure nature presupposes a "watered-down" notion of ends, one that is extrinsic: the end cannot be changed without destroying the nature (end as destiny, vs. end as destination)

Only small step to considering man completely separate from his supernatural end: supernatural end becomes unnecessary, thus unreal--pure nature as theological groundwork for secularism

If the supernatural comes to us "from the outside," how is it not alienating, a destructive force to our very nature? How can the human person even possess a capacity to receive such a gift? Doesn't this understanding tend toward a voluntaristic or moralistic understanding of man's response to God's call?

Is the sequela Christi an addition which we do as Catholics but which is not really necessary for a full human life?Or is it the very purpose and end of our human existence?

Nature was created for God: this is the most fundamental datum about man, that which orders everything else we can say about him; it shapes man's nature within from the beginning 
  • Man's is therefore fundamentally open, this openness to God constitutes the innermost essence of his being, the meaning and purpose of his very existence

If God is going to call a creature to share in his divine life, he must create a creature with the capacity to receive this call.

Man has a natural desire for supernatural beatitude, not for a purely natural fulfillment

Man's spiritual, personal nature, this "desire of human nature" for the supernatural end, "is man himself." For de Lubac, this desire grounds the very sense of man's status as imago Dei (ordination to divinization).

Human nature as it really exists, in other words, was made to share in divine life, and this purpose of creation implies that the supernatural end of man--an end which all agree is man's concrete, historical end--is not "accidentally" related to his personal nature.

Natural desire must not be thought of as, in itself, the beginnings of supernatural life or grace, nor as some kind of latent power to achieve the supernatural; it is "merely" a capacity to receive God's call to divine life.

Paradox of man: while human nature's only final end is supernatural, the supernatural fulfillment of this end comes as something utterly and radically new and unanticipated. God created man so that he could give himself to man. This gift constitutes a movement of essential freedom, of absolute gratuity.

God creates man (the first "moment of gratuity) and God calls man (the second "moment of gratuity).

Man's deepest longing is for that which is not only utterly beyond his power, but also beyond the horizon of his experience and expectation.

According to de Lubac, we must keep a certain necessary tension in place (hence, paradox) if we are to avoid on the one hand a collapse into immanentism, and on the other a mere juxtaposition that separates nature from its destiny (=dualism, extrinsicism).

God's gift of himself in grace is not simply a continuation of creation. De Lubac emphasizes that passage from nature to the supernatural is as great as the distance from non-being to being.

While the first gift (creation) must at all costs be kept distinct from the second (grace), concretely the two cannot be separated, temporally or otherwise.

We must shift from an anthropocentric perspective to a theocentric one: we have to see God's creative act from the standpoint of his intention. The second moment of gratuity is the first in the order of intention. If God is going to call and give himself to his creature, he must create a creature who is capable of receiving this gift.

The nature of man, as spiritual and personal, must therefore be understood as analogous to sub-human nature.

Man "desires" that which--of its very nature--can only be received gratuitously. The one thing that is ultimately fulfilling for him is the one thing that he cannot provide for himself. In short, what he desires is the self-gift of the other, that is to say, love, which must necessarily be absolutely free.

On the one hand, nature's supernatural end is instrinsic, since it is only life in God that can finally fulfill the spiritual creature's nature; indeed, this finality is the ultimate inner reality of that nature. On the other hand, the supernatural is in no way "continuous" with or possessed in "anticipation" by or somehow "owed" to nature. The supernatural must become as a new birth, a re-creation, an opening within the creature of what is utterly beyond its nature.

The supernatural reaches to the core of nature, and yet is radically new to nature.

Man is called, not simply to be fully human, but even to surpass himself (i.e. divinization)

Man's "desire" is never known for what it is until it has been revealed to him. Hence, without revelation, man experiences this desire as a kind of Augustinian "restlessness."

Man is the creature whose finite capacity can only be fulfilled by the infinite.

No comments:

Post a Comment